Why the New York Stock Exchange Shut Down in 1914
On Friday, July 31, 1914, the New York Stock Exchange did not open. There was nothing wrong with the building, and the United States was not at war. The fear was that, if Wall Street opened, investors in Europe would sell American securities and turn some of the proceeds into gold bound for home. So the exchange shut its doors. Stocks would not trade on its floor again until December.
The trouble was that Wall Street was also where American banks expected to turn securities into money in a hurry. Closing the exchange made it harder for gold to leave through one important channel. It also made it harder for banks to get their hands on cash at home. The second problem began as soon as New York tried to solve the first.
How selling a railroad share could send gold overseas
Under the gold standard, the dollar’s link to gold was a commitment to convert at a fixed rate, not simply a way of describing what a dollar was worth. It mattered when someone wanted to move a large sum across the Atlantic.
Picture a London investor holding shares in an American railroad. She wants money at home. She can sell the shares in New York for dollars and use the proceeds to buy sterling. Most such transactions do not need a single gold bar to move. But if enough people want sterling at once, its dollar price can rise until it becomes cheaper to obtain gold in the United States, ship and insure it, and realize its value in Britain than to pay the going exchange rate. The gold link made physical shipment an option when exchange markets came under enough pressure.
Treasury Secretary William G. McAdoo worried that heavy sales of foreign-owned securities would accelerate that process. If enough gold left, confidence in the United States’ ability to maintain convertibility could weaken, making a run at home more likely. The NYSE’s governors, after meeting with leading bankers, suspended trading. This was a way to obstruct large-scale liquidation in the main market, not a ban on every private trade or a guarantee that gold would stop leaving.
The price of taking away the exit
A New York bank could lend to a broker against a portfolio of stocks, with the right to call the loan for repayment. On an ordinary day, that looked like a readily available source of cash. The broker could sell securities to repay the bank. If the broker failed, the bank could try to sell the collateral itself.
With the exchange shut, the right to call a loan was still there. What had changed was the borrower’s ability to repay it on demand. Even a well-run railroad could not make its shares easy to sell by running its trains on time. A bank might know exactly what the shares last fetched and have no idea what a buyer would pay for them that morning.
That mattered beyond the city. Banks elsewhere held balances with New York correspondent banks and could ask for cash when their own customers wanted withdrawals. When those requests came in, New York banks could not rely on one of their usual ways of raising money. The disruption also reached borrowers who had no part in the stock-market panic. The New York Fed’s first annual report records that some municipalities were unable to sell their bonds and that new financing was postponed.
Two kinds of emergency money
The Federal Reserve had been created in law in December 1913, but its 12 Reserve Banks didn’t open for business until November 16, 1914. In July, the country had a central bank on paper and a cash problem in real life. Two stopgaps filled different parts of the gap.
The first was emergency currency under the Aldrich–Vreeland Act, a provision Congress had passed after the Panic of 1907. Participating banks could obtain extra national bank notes against eligible assets such as municipal bonds and short-term commercial paper, rather than relying on the usual backing with U.S. government bonds. Banks could hand the notes to customers who wanted to withdraw cash. They couldn’t count them as legal reserves, and the notes couldn’t settle an international transaction. About US$386 million was issued over the life of the program, according to Yale’s reconstruction of the episode.
The second stopgap worked behind the counter. The New York Clearing House issued loan certificates against collateral. Member banks could use them to settle with each other through the clearing house, conserving regular cash. A grocer couldn’t take one of those certificates home. It was useful precisely because it didn’t need to circulate outside the network that accepted it.
The distinction explains why one fix wasn’t enough. A bank can get through the day on the clearing house’s books and still run short of currency at its branches. It can have a drawer full of domestic notes and still be unable to use them to settle a foreign obligation. What matters is what the person or institution on the other side will accept.
The market that moved down the street
The official ticker fell silent for these stocks, but the need to trade did not. An informal market took shape on New Street, near the exchange. Its quotes didn’t go out on the NYSE ticker, and leading newspapers initially withheld them. Buyers and sellers could still find each other, but the gap between what a buyer offered and what a seller asked tended to be wider. That gap was part of the cost of trading without a widely visible price.
Economist William Silber compared those unofficial quotes with opening prices when stock trading resumed. In his sample of 40 stocks, 21 reopened within the previous day’s New Street bid–ask range. The street market couldn’t match the old exchange, but some of its prices were closer to what traders would actually pay than the official quotes left over from July.
The reopening came in stages. Some bond trading resumed on November 28 at minimum prices. Stocks returned on December 12, also subject to price floors and other restrictions. The remaining restrictions were lifted on April 1, 1915. Saying the exchange shut for four months is broadly right for floor trading in stocks. Saying nobody could trade until December, or that normal trading returned on the first day, misses most of the story.
What a shutdown can buy
A modern U.S. market-wide circuit breaker generally buys minutes or the rest of a trading day, not a season. Its thresholds are tied to a drop in the S&P 500, not the risk of gold exports. But 1914 still raises a useful question: what will come due while the place you count on to raise cash is closed?
The practical test is to take the preferred market out of a liquidity plan for a day or a week. Which withdrawals, margin demands, and payments still fall due? Which assets can be pledged without selling, and who has committed to accept them? A line of credit that settles tomorrow is no answer to a payment due this afternoon. Nor is a backup broker much help if it depends on the same market as the first.
In 1914, the closure could slow some sales and buy time. It could not make a broker’s loan repayable, give a town a buyer for its bonds, or put notes in a depositor’s hand. For that, Wall Street needed other arrangements. The exchange was closed. The bills still came due.
Important sources
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, First Annual Report, 1915:
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/historical/frbny/1915_frb_newyork.pdf
Federal Reserve History, Reserve Banks Open for Business:
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/reserve-banks-open
Yale Program on Financial Stability, Aldrich–Vreeland Emergency Currency:
Margaret M. Jacobson and Ellis W. Tallman, Liquidity Provision During the Crisis of 1914:
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/historical/frbclev/wp/frbclv_2013-04r.pdf
William L. Silber, What Happened to Liquidity When World War I Shut the NYSE?:
William L. Silber, The Great Financial Crisis of 1914:
https://archive.nyu.edu/jspui/handle/2451/26369
NYSE, Market-Wide Circuit Breakers:
