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The Morning Cash Got Scarce on Wall Street

Treasury securities were abundant. Cash was available somewhere. The trouble was getting it to the firms that needed it before the day was out.

The 2019 Repo Spike: When Safe Collateral Wasn’t Enough

On September 17, 2019, firms borrowing overnight against U.S. Treasury securities suddenly had to pay rates that would have looked absurd only a few days earlier. One widely watched benchmark, the Secured Overnight Financing Rate, or SOFR, hit 5.25% on an annualized basis. This wasn’t a run on a bank whose loans nobody understood. The collateral was U.S. government debt. What was in short supply was cash at the right desk, on the right morning.

The New York Fed stepped in that day with an overnight lending operation. But the more interesting question came before the rescue: why did private lenders not rush to collect the higher rates? The answer starts with a distinction that balance sheets tend to hide. Owning a safe asset, having cash, and being able to move that cash where it is needed are three different things.

The loan that looks like a sale

A repurchase agreement, or repo, is a way of borrowing cash against securities. A dealer sells securities to a cash provider and agrees to buy them back later at a specified price. The difference between the two prices is the financing cost. The legal form is a sale and repurchase; the economics resemble a secured loan. The same transaction is a repo from the cash borrower’s side and a reverse repo from the cash lender’s side.

Suppose a dealer receives US$10 million for Treasuries worth US$10.2 million, agreeing to buy them back the next day for US$10 million plus interest. If the dealer fails to honor the agreement, the lender has the securities. The extra US$200,000 of collateral gives the lender a buffer if their price falls or selling them costs money. That buffer is the idea behind a haircut. It is separate from the repo rate, which is the charge for using the cash.

The overnight rate and the haircut answer different questions. If a lender raises the rate, the same US$10 million becomes more expensive to borrow. If it lends only US$9.8 million against the same securities, the dealer has an immediate US$200,000 funding gap even if the quoted rate barely changes. A desk that tracks the cost of borrowing but not how much lenders will advance can miss that second problem entirely.

Dealers use repo to finance securities they hold while making markets for customers. Cash investors, such as money market funds, can use it to place money for short periods against collateral. For one side, the attraction is funding without having to sell the position outright and walk away. For the other, it is an interest-earning place to put cash without relying solely on the borrower’s promise. Neither side needs to want the securities as a long-term investment for the transaction to make sense.

Two routine events hit the same balance sheet

Mid-September brought two demands for cash. Companies were paying quarterly taxes, and buyers were settling newly issued Treasury securities. Both sent money into the Treasury’s account at the Federal Reserve. In the process, reserve balances held by commercial banks at the Fed fell. At the same time, dealers had more securities to finance as the newly issued Treasuries settled.

Think of a corporate tax payment. The company instructs its commercial bank to pay. The bank debits the company’s deposit, and settlement shifts balances from the banking system to the Treasury’s account at the Fed. The money has not vanished. But while it sits in the Treasury’s account, it is not sitting in a commercial bank’s reserve account, available to that bank for payments or other uses. Treasury spending can send balances back in the other direction, but that does not help a dealer that needs funding today.

Neither tax day nor Treasury settlement was a surprise. What surprised the market was how much the two events mattered when they landed together. The system needed to finance more securities just as bank reserves were falling. A calendar entry that looked routine in isolation became consequential when several desks were all planning around the same dollars.

The backdrop made the timing worse. Reserve balances had been falling from earlier highs as the Fed reduced its securities holdings and other liabilities, such as currency in circulation, grew. Fed researchers put reserves at about US$1.34 trillion after the September drop. That still sounds enormous. But a system-wide total says nothing about which institutions hold the reserves, how much each can spare, or whether the relevant desks can move them before settlement. A trillion-dollar figure can coexist with a very real shortage for a particular borrower.

Why the cash didn’t simply go where it paid best

When rates spike, the textbook answer is that lenders should supply more cash and take the higher return. In practice, the firms with cash aren’t all interchangeable, and neither are the markets they can reach. A money market fund can lend through arrangements it already has in place, but it cannot instantly act as a bank. A dealer may be able to borrow in one segment and lend in another, but doing so uses its balance sheet and depends on counterparties, limits, and timing.

Banks also need reserves to handle their own payments and potential outflows. A reserve balance that looks large to an outside observer may be close to what a bank’s treasury desk wants to hold going into the day. The decision is not simply whether a secured loan offers an attractive return. It is whether the bank can spare cash now without compromising obligations that may arrive later. Federal Reserve researchers found that broad reserve conditions and the way different parts of the repo market traded both mattered; there wasn’t a single switch someone could flip to move all available cash.

There is an important distinction here between collateral quality and funding access. Treasury securities reduce a repo lender’s exposure if the borrower defaults. They do not compel anyone to lend, give a dealer unlimited borrowing capacity, or give a bank more room on its balance sheet. A security can be excellent collateral and still fail to produce cash on the terms or timetable its owner expected.

One bridge between these markets was the Federal Home Loan Banks. They could place short-term funds in either repo or federal funds, and they also needed money available to lend to their own members. When secured rates rose, unsecured borrowers had to compete with a more attractive alternative; at the same time, the Home Loan Banks had reason to keep cash available for their members. You did not have to trade a Treasury repo to feel the effects of the disruption.

What the Fed actually did

On September 17, the New York Fed’s trading desk announced an overnight repo operation of up to US$75 billion with primary dealers. Eligible collateral included Treasuries, agency debt, and agency mortgage-backed securities. Its stated purpose was to help keep the federal funds rate inside the target range of 2% to 2.25%. That detail matters: SOFR measures overnight borrowing secured by Treasuries, while the federal funds rate measures a different, unsecured market. Pressure had spilled beyond the repo desks.

The Fed did not have to decide that Treasuries were undervalued, or commit to buying them outright. It provided cash against eligible securities under agreements designed to unwind, starting with overnight funding. That let the central bank add reserves without asking an existing private lender to give up its own cash cushion first. The intervention addressed the immediate funding pressure; it did not make each firm’s internal liquidity limits disappear.

The first operation supplied about US$53 billion in additional reserves, not the full US$75 billion offered. The next three overnight operations that week were fully subscribed, and overnight rates stabilized over the remainder of the week. The distinction between the ceiling and the amount supplied is useful: the first number tells you what the Fed stood ready to provide; the second tells you what dealers actually took at that operation.

A 5.25% overnight rate also does not mean a borrower paid 5.25% of principal for one night. On US$100 million, using a 360-day convention, 5.25% annualized is about US$14,600 for one day, compared with about US$6,250 at 2.25%. The dollar difference for a single night is not the whole problem. It is what the price says about getting funded at all, how much a dealer can carry, and what happens if the shortfall lasts or repeats.

How a safe asset becomes a funding problem

Consider a dealer holding a bond it expects to sell next month, financed with a repo that matures tomorrow. The bond may still be sound tomorrow morning. The financing is nevertheless due. The dealer needs to roll it, use its own cash, borrow somewhere else, or sell the bond. If lots of firms face the same choice at once, the options that looked comfortable in normal conditions may become expensive together.

The haircut is another possible source of pressure, distinct from the rate spike itself. If a cash provider is willing to lend against a bond but reduces the fraction it will advance, the borrower must contribute more cash or post more collateral. An asset that was easy to finance on Monday can soak up working capital on Tuesday without becoming a bad credit. September 2019 is an example of severe pressure on the price and availability of overnight funding, not evidence that every lender raised haircuts that morning.

The practical lesson goes beyond repo. When mapping a payment or financing flow, start with the hour the cash is due, then work backward. Which legal entity holds it? What account is it in? Who can move it, on which rail, and before which cutoff? If the plan depends on converting securities into cash, ask who is committed to providing it and what happens if the usual desk declines or offers less. Apply the same test to both legs of a trade: where the collateral is available and where the cash must settle may be different places.

The events of September 2019 exposed a weakness that can be hard to see in an end-of-day report. A firm can own good collateral, the financial system can hold plenty of assets, and a payment can still come due before the right institution has the cash to make it. The test of liquidity is not what you own. It is what you can turn into spendable money by the time someone needs to be paid.

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Page Last Updated: 15-Nov-2026 (3227063)